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Abstract 
This article is about the application of lawfare as a tool of a hybrid war. After analyzing the 
existing positions in the academic debate, a working definition of the latter is given; then the main 
theoretical postulates are operationalized as empirical indicators and finally, four cases of 
Russia’s lawfare against Bulgaria are stated. It is argued that lawfare can be used to achieve the 
capture of the state, what eventually is a goal of every war, including the hybrid one and that such 
a capture is more probable in states which are former Russian satellites, where Russia indirectly 
can impact national legislative and decision making process. 
 
Keywords: Lawfare, hybrid war, economic capture, state capture, Bulgaria-Russia relations.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The rise of the liberal order, especially after the creation of the League of 
Nations (after 1944 – the United Nations), saw increased importance of the law 
in international relations. The reasons for that are probably rooted from one side 
in the globalization, which provides new challenges that cannot be dealt with 
easily in isolation, and on the other side – the desire for peace and the lessons 
learned – from the horrors of the First and Second World wars. The 
establishment of a large body of international law has observable results in the 
absence of new, third world conflict, and is also responsible for the solution of 
several crises over time that could have led to armed conflicts. Nevertheless, 
countries have tried to abuse international law more than once, in order to 
achieve their strategic or operational goals, while operating largely outside of 
it.
1
 China, for example, used legal warfare to manipulate national and 
international law to further its economic and geostrategic interests in the South 
                                               
*  Yavor Raychev is PhD Student at the University of Granada, Spain 
(yavorraychev1988@gmail.com). 
1  Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?,” Case Western Reserve Journal 
of International Law Vol. 43, Issue 1-2 (2020): 141. 
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China Sea and the Arctic.
2
 Russia two times tried to promote (March-April, 
2020) the draft resolution of the UN General Assembly named “Declaration of 
solidarity of the United Nations in the face of the challenges posed by the 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19),” whose real purpose was the lifting of 
international sanctions imposed on it for the illegal annexation of Crimea.
3
 
Phenomena like above mentioned gave birth to the term “lawfare” – a form of 
hybrid war used on several occasions by Russia against Bulgaria. 
 In comparison with other tools, lawfare is less discussed, probably 
because its effects are not as spectacular as those of cyber war, fake news, and 
some others. Nevertheless, as far as it creates dangerous precedents, lawfare is a 
serious threat to international, regional, and national security. Several authors 
have made valuable contributions to its better understanding. Charles Dunlap is 
a pioneer in the field; Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Antonio Munoz 
Mosquera did a lot for the development of the concept. Orde Kittrie 
operationalized it and transformed the theory in indicators, suitable to resolve 
more practical tasks. José Ramón Suberviola Gilabert presented a systematic 
view on the state of art. The works of these authors constitute the first corpus of 
literature the analysis in this paper relies on. The second corpus has to do with 
hybrid war. Together with “classical ideas” of Thomas M. Huber about 
compound warfare, Paul Brister and Jack McCuen, with their views on hybrid 
war as an asymmetric one, several modern and challenging ideas can be also 
found. Jan Almäng launched the idea about vagueness and hybrid war; Andreas 
Krieg and Rickli Jean-Marc introduced the term “surrogate war”, Vladimir 
Rauta offered a new typology of state and non-state actors in hybrid war, to 
mention some.  The third corpus of literature has to do with the Russian 
experience in hybrid war, analyzed by Bettina Renz, Tony Balasevicius, Mary 
Ellen Connel, Sarah Vogler and others. The last group of sources is composed 
of open media publications shedding light on the cases chosen. 
 Scope, content, novelty, and conditions under which it could be 
successfully implemented are in the center of academic debates about lawfare. 
Is it a helpful tool that contributes to better understanding of the changing face 
of the war, or is something already seen? In order to find an answer, I first 
analyze “hybrid war” and “lawfare” as multidimensional, multilevel concepts as 
well as the relationship between them; then describe Russian experience in the 
                                               
2  Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Andres Mosquera, “China’s Strategic Preconditioning in 
the Twenty-first Century,” Air University, April 13, 2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/ Wild-Blue-Yonder/ 
Article-Display/Article/2145001/chinas-strategic-preconditioning-in-the-twenty-first-century/.  
3  General Assembly of the United Nations, “Declaration of solidarity of the United Nations 
in the face of the challenges posed by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19),” April 
17, 2020, https://www.un.org/pga/74/2020/04/17/declaration-of-solidarity-of-the-united-
nations-in-the-face-of-the-challenges-posed-by-the-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/.  
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field and finally, implementing a set of indicators, operationalize the concept 
what allowed me to analyze and assess chosen cases.  
  
 
From Theory to Practice: Multi-level Analysis 
 
The logic of the research follows the designed structure of the paper and 
starts with the development of the concepts, needed not only because they by 
themselves are objects of aminated academic debates and as a rule, do not enjoy 
universally accepted understanding, but because the development of a concept 
is more than providing a definition; “it is deciding what is important about the 
entity.”
4
 Goertz states that more significant concepts have a three-level 
structure. Thus, if we accept that lawfare is one of the tools of hybrid warfare, 
hybrid warfare itself should be treated as a basic level or a “cognitively central” 
concept. It appears in several works; although their critical analysis goes beyond 
the limits and the scope of this paper, a deeper look would contribute to the 
identification of important features of this phenomenon.  
As a tool of hybrid war, lawfare can be used to achieve the capture of the 
state, that eventually is a goal of every war, including the hybrid one: such a 
capture is more probable in states which are former Russian satellites, where 
Russia indirectly can impact the national legislative and decision making 
process. Guided by my definition of hybrid war as mentioned in one of the next 
sections, I argue that lawfare is a source of hybridity when it is combined with 
others which are not necessarily kinetic means. Understanding the latter as 
means that “creates power”,
5
 “does not rely on the release of kinetic energy,” 
does not cause physical destruction,
6
 and contributes to the achievement of the 
goals of hybrid war. In order to prove the above-mentioned hypothesis, I 
analyze four cases of lawfare of Russia against Bulgaria.   
The third level is the level of indicators, which relates more abstract 
issues of theory to the ontological world. In order to define whether the chosen 
cases are cases of lawfare, I use a set of indicators, offered by Kittrie to which I 
added two new ones.   
The cases are chosen from sensitive for both countries’ areas: energy and 
arms industry. Bulgaria was – and still is – strongly dependent on the Russian 
                                               
4  Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 6-63. 
5  Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 379 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006).  
6  Frans Osinga, “The Promise, Practice and Challenges of Non-Kinetic Instruments of 
Power,” in Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017: Winning Without 
Killing:The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crises, ed. 
Paul A.L. Ducheine and Frans P.B. Osinga (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017), 1-18. 
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Federation as far as it has not yet diversified oil supplies, while a great part of 
the weapons of the Bulgarian army are produced in Russia. Since Bulgaria, in 
accordance with its national interests and Euro-Atlantic geopolitical orientation, 
is looking to break this dependency, the Russian Federation, in consonance with 
its concept of Bulgaria as its “Trojan horse” in EU and NATO, tries to keep it 
and undermine the unity of the member states, as well as the confidence of 
Bulgaria as a reliable partner. Three criteria have been applied to choose the 
cases: all are relevant for the parties to the conflict; all haven’t been resolved 
through negotiations or other peaceful means; all need legal regulation. 
 
 
Hybrid War: the Basic-level Concept 
 
 Defining hybrid war is not an easy task. In the academic debate, there 
are two different schools, which I call “Russian” and “Western”; they offer a 
different interpretation of it.  
The Western school based largely on the works of scholars like Frank 
Hoffman, Thomas Huber, William Lind, Thomas Hammes, William Nemeth, 
David Kilcullen and others, focuses on cases in which a big and powerful army 
attacks an incomparably weaker one. Hoffman analyzes Hezbollah’s retaliation 
against the Israeli army,
7
 Nemeth speaks about the Chechen wars.
8
 Turbiville 
insists that hybrid war is not a new kind of war, but a new perspective on 
warfare which obtains new relevance due to globalization, mass communication 
and the speed or technology innovation.
9
  Paul Brister emphasizes the nature of 
hybrid war as a limited one in which the purpose is to break the enemy’s ability 
or will to resist, but not to the point when its society and economy are 
irretrievably shattered.
10
 J. McCuen calls attention to the specific characteristic 
of hybrid war – its battlefield is the population in the conflict zone, as well as 
the home and the international community population.
11
  
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the illegal annexation of 
Crimea, in what “Russia’s conventional military forces, which traditionally lead 
such operations, played only a supporting role”
12
 does not fit in the framework, 
                                               
7  Frank G. Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars,” Arlington: 
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (2007), 51. 
8  William J. Nemeth, “Future war and Chechnya: a case for hybrid warfare” (PhD diss., 
Monterey: California Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 1-76. 
9  Graham Turbiville, “Russian Special Forces,” The JSOU Pamphet 05-1 (August 2020): 1-36. 
10  Brister, Paul. “Revisiting the Gordian Knot: Strategic Considerations for Hybrid 
Warfare,” in Hybrid Warfare and Transnational Threats: Perspectives for an Era of 
Persistent Conflict, ed. Paul Brister, William H. Natter and Robert R. Tomes (New York, 
Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, 2011), 51. 
11  John McCuen, “Hybrid wars,” Military Review (2008), 107-113. 
12  Tony Balasevicius, “Looking for Little Green Men: Understanding Russia’s Employment 
of Hybrid Warfare,” Canadian Military Journal (2017). 
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elaborated on the basis of Afghanistan, Lebanon and Iraq societies. As a result, 
new visions about hybrid war appeared, pointing out such features as: blurred 
boundaries between conventional and unconventional;
13
 implementation of 
cyber activities; fake news; misinformation and disinformation campaigns; 
economic warfare and many others. Terms as “surrogate wars” appeared, 
referring to wars in which “the state is increasingly looking to externalize the 
burden of warfare to human and technological surrogates”, which results in a 
change of employment, from soldiers-citizens to professional soldiers.
14
 
Although Krieg insists that this kind of war is non-trinitarian, I would say that it 
is. The trinity, however, instead of being the government, the people and the 
army, is the government, the communities and the human surrogates. Vladimir 
Rauta steps further while offering a new conceptualization of the role of violent 
non-state actors as auxiliary, affiliate, surrogate and proxy.
15
 Some new 
definitions combine military and social points of view, explaining hybrid war as 
“synchronized use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific 
vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve 
synergistic effects.”
16
 Hybrid war is increasingly linked to the so-called grey 
zone between peace and war – that sub-threshold zone, where neither the 
perpetrator, nor the hostile act can be easily identified. Ontological unclarity, 
referring to “where it is permissible to draw the boundary between peace and 
war” and epistemological unclarity, pointing out “where one or both of the 
parties to the conflict lack knowledge of the relevant contextual parameters of 
the conflict,”
17
 introduced by Almäng, form that coordinate system, according 
to which a given conflict can be assessed as a borderline cases of war, i.e., as a 
hybrid war.  
In the Russian school, on the other hand, with authors such as Messner, 
Isserson, Surkov, Kozyrev, Denisov, Bartosh, Pocheptsov, Gerasimov and 
Dugin the focus is not entirely on the military aspect. Many of the authors have 
civilian background – During is a sociologist, Bartosh is a political scientist, 
Kozyrev and Surkov are experts in international relations. In the Russian view 
of hybrid war, the impact on population is at the center. From this stems another 
major difference – Western scholars tend to describe the hybrid war as a tool, to 
                                               
13  Thomas M. Huber, “Compound warfare: a conceptual framework,” in Compound 
warfare: that fatal knot, ed. Thomas M. Huber (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army CGS 
College Press, 2002), 310. 
14  Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli, “Surrogate warfare: the art of war in 21st century?,” 
Defense Studies 18, no. 2, (2018): 1. 
15  Vladimir Rauta, “Towards a typology of non-state actors in ‘hybrid warfare’: proxy, 
auxiliary, surrogate and affiliated forces,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 
(September 2019): 1-7. 
16  Sean Monaghan, Patrick Cullen and Njord Wegge, “MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare 
Project: Understanding Hybrid Warfare, A Multinational Capability Development 
Campaign project,” MCDC (2019): 3. 
17  Jan Almäng, “War, vagueness and hybrid war,” Defence Studies 19, no. 2 (2019): 189-204. 
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which certain groups resort in specific times, while Russian scholars describe it 
as something that has to be ongoing all the time anytime. 
Another debate is about the kinetic element in a hybrid war. Several 
scholars consider that without it, there is no warfare. Taking into consideration 
the example of Crimea, they insist that the conflict “was not ‘won’ with non-
military means alone. These efforts were backed up by special forces, auxiliary 
fighters and the implicit threat of more military force to come.”
18
 Since this 
point of view, “‘hybrid warfare’ is only one of many concepts in the history of 
strategic thought that claims to offer a war-winning formula”, but nothing 
more.
19
 Four years after these events, we see that states can put in energy 
blockade without use of physical arms; that governments can be compelled to 
execute other states’ will and that, finally, people can fall victims of 
disinformation or misinformation in the literary sense of the word. 
Following such a line of thought, I define hybrid war as any political act 
that aims to compel our enemy to do our will; an act, which combines more 
than one form of violence (but does not include necessary physical or kinetic 
component) and is directed above all to the destruction of the institutions 
(through eroding trust and governability), communities (through impeding 
informed individual and collective choices) and society, threatening it through 
interference in national decision making process and impact on public opinion. 
According to such a view, the essence of hybrid war is a combination of several 
tools; lawfare is one of them. Historically, it has been successfully implemented 
together with economic influence; both can lead to state capture, understood as 
a result of manipulation of a country “by dominating – and abusing – strategic 
sectors of its economy (which we will refer to as “economic capture”) and 
another that centers on the cultivation of political relationships with aspiring 
autocrats, nationalists, populists, Eurosceptic, and Russian sympathizers (or 
“political capture”).
20
 
 
 
Second-level Concept: Lawfare 
 
The second level concept is “lawfare”. Coined first by Dunlap in 2001, it 
is defined by him as “use or misuse the law as a substitute for traditional 
military means to achieve an operational objective.”
21
 As a military (Charles J. 
Dunlap himself is a Major General of the United States Air Force), he 
                                               
18  Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith, “Russia and hybrid warfare –going beyond the label, part 
II” in Aleksanteri Papers 1/2016, (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 2016), 11. 
19  Bettina Renz, 2016, “Russia and ‘hybrid warfare’, Contemporary Politics,” Contemporary 
Politics Volume 22, (2016): 5. 
20  Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare,” CAN (March 
2017): 1-32. 
21  Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “Lawfare Today: A Perspective,” Yale Journal of International 
Affairs (2008): 146-154. 
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interpreted the term in the context of his speculations on the modern military 
intervention. Pointing out that “lawfare is a concept that is ever more frequently 
discussed in government, academic, and media circles”, he considers that “that 
discussion is not as informed as it might be”,
22
 at last because of the fact that 
“lawfare” has been used by several people in quite different context since the 
1970s. Another reason is that the world became very legalistic and complex, 
which caused a revolution in legal military affairs. For him, lawfare is an arm as 
any other, which can be used for justifiable and non-justifiable purposes; his 
intention is to apply the term neutrally in order to better reveal its heuristic 
capabilities. This means lawfare is to be understood in its initial context as an 
analysis of “how law might be used in armed conflict,”
23
 rather than as a 
description of a relation between law and warfare: “It focuses principally on 
circumstances where law can create the same or similar effects as those 
ordinarily sought from conventional war making approaches.”
24
 It is the opinion 
of the scholar that this is a form of effect-based operations, designed to achieve 
specific results “that contribute directly to desired military and political 
outcomes.”
25
 Dunlop clearly states that lawfare should not be reduced to 
propaganda and glorification, because it is much richer and complicated, nor to 
PR for the militaries. It requires effective communication with those who are 
fighting and with media in order to explain “what the law does – and does not – 
require”
26
 during wartime.  
In its contemporary understanding, lawfare is “one of many tools used by 
human beings in their interactions.”
27
 Apart from reflecting the closest relation 
between war and law, it denominates the use of law “in all its aspects, as a 
tool… that the Armed Forces can use to achieve the tasks they have entrusted”; 
it focuses on „instrumentalization of law in relation to the specific aspect of its 
employment in military operations,”
28
 and sheds light on the implementation of 
law “in order to achieve the same or similar effects to those which could be 
achieved through conventional physical military actions.”
29
 Lawfare refers to 
the use and/or abuse of the rule of law in a defensive and offensive capacity to 
                                               
22  Ibid. 
23  Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?,” Case Western Reserve Journal 
of International Law (2010): 141. 
24  Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-Century Conflicts?,” JFQ 
Issue 54 (2009): 34. 
25  Edward C. Mann III, Gary Endersby, and Thomas R. Searle, “Thinking Effects. Effects-
Based Methodology for Joint Operations,” Air university (2002): 15. 
26  Dunlap Jr., “Lawfare: A Decisive Element,” 37. 
27  Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Andres Mosquera, “Understanding Lawfare in a Hybrid 
Warfare Context,” NATO Legal Gazette (October 2016): 1. 
28  José Gilabert, “Lawfare. El uso del derecho como arma,” Revista Española de Derecho 
Militar no. 106 (2015): 190-194. 
29  Orde Kittrie, Lawfare: law as a weapon of war (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 11. 
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achieve operational success without the need to employ kinetic methods of 
warfighting,
30
 or to the use of law as a weapon with the goal of manipulating the 
law by changing legal paradigms.
31
 Reviewing the state of art in the field, David 
Hughes
32
 concludes that currently “lawfare” has three main interpretations: 
lawfare as the use and abuse of international law to threaten state interests; lawfare 
as a rhetorical device intended to discredit parties which attempt to engage with 
international law as a means to ensure accountability and compliance; and as a 
weapon, the legitimacy of which is defined by its user’s intentions.
33
 
There is no doubt that the link between law, legitimacy and war is deep 
and inseparable: no military command will take any decision without being 
absolutely convinced that it is lawful, legitimate and legitimised by public 
opinion. Examples are more than abundant. In our Western societies’ wars, as a 
rule, are not supported by the general public, especially in Europe. This position 
can easily be verified by the various opinion polls, conducted in occasion of the 
USA led invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the concrete numbers might 
slightly vary from country to country, in Spain in April 2003, one of the largest 
newspapers El Pais, claimed that 98,6% of the Spanish people opposed the war 
and 92,2% opposed Aznar’s decision to invade Iraq and asked his resignation.
34
 
While this was not a representative study, there are little reasons to doubt this 
was a general trend. Gallup International Polls have found out that the support, 
even if it is backed by the UN, is low in Romania and Bulgaria as well – only 
38% and 28% respectively, as reported by BBC European Affairs analyst.
35
 The 
said is true to some extent even for the US, where 72% supported the invasion 
and 25% opposed it strongly.
36
 This demonstrates the internal difficulty any 
government faces when it comes to start or support a war. On the other hand, 
declaration of war damages country’s image in the eyes of other countries – in 
relation to the invasion in Iraq, Forca poll claimed that 57% of Germans held 
the opinion that “the United States is a nation of warmongers.”
37
 The reality of 
the modern world is that we don’t live anymore in a place where political 
                                               
30  Swedish Defense University, Hybrid Threats and Asymmetric Warfare: What to do? 
(Stockholm: Swedish Defense University, 2017), 18. 
31  Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Andres B. Munoz Mosquera, “Hybrid warfare and 
lawfare,” The Operational Law quarterly 16-1 (November 2015): 2. 
32  David Hughes, “What does lawfare mean?“, Fordham International Law Journal vol. 40 
(2016): 5. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Clara Blanchar, “El 92% de los participantes en la consulta piden la dimisión de Aznar,” El 
Pais, April 2, 2003, https://elpais.com/diario/2003/04/02/catalunya/1049245644_850215.html.  
35  William Horsley, “Polls find Europeans oppose Iraq war”, BBC, February 11, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2747175.stm.  
36  Gallup International, “Seventy-Two Percent of Americans Support War Against Iraq,” 
Gallup, March 24 2003, https://news.gallup.com/poll/8038/seventytwo-percent-
americans-support-war-against-iraq.aspx.  
37  William Horsley, “Polls find Europeans oppose Iraq war,” BBC, February 11, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2747175.stm.  
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leaders can simply say “Follow me!” and everybody would follow – without 
any legal reasons - especially when it comes to war. The initial support, even 
when existing like in the case of United States of America, could erode fast. 
And if it is found that the war is being conducted in an unfair and inhumane 
way, that effect might multiply rapidly, leading to deep transformations.  
Nowadays, news and propaganda reach audiences much faster than before – 
world and war are “mediatized.”
38
 In a democratic state with rule of law and 
independent media, this is not just a public relations problem, but can lead to deep 
state policy changes, including changing agenda and ultimately – changing of ruling 
class. “Mediatization” requires much more and much faster formulated legal 
reasons of military acts. Lawfare becomes much more important. 
 
 
Hybrid War and Lawfare 
 
Lawfare is taking a central role in hybrid warfare due to its ability to 
distort public opinion and alter the ethical and legal discourse of the home and 
foreign societies. When national and international law are used as a weapon, 
lawfare can be a positive and negative force. In some cases, lawfare has been 
used instead of traditional military means, which saved human lives and 
potentially prevented humanitarian crises. The negative aspect, on the other 
hand, is evident in cases when it is used to compromise the national security of 
the country and its democratic values or the rule of law itself. As Charles J. 
Dunlap says, “in the 21 century we should expect to see further development of 
lawfare. We may not like iterations, but we should never forget that legal battles 
are always preferable to real battles, and modern democracies are well-suited to 
wage – and win – legal “wars.”
39
 
Lawfare, understood as a threat to use/misuse the law, can be effectively 
employed as a tool of hybrid war. It gives a chance to the adversaries to be 
flexible and adapt quickly to the surroundings. This includes the ability to find 
fast potential weaknesses and exploit them:  
 
“Lawfare has become an integral element of any Hybrid Warfare strategy and its affirmative 
use should become an element of Western military thinking and planning. Although lawfare is 
used unscrupulously by state or non-state actors, this shouldn’t discourage international actors 
from continuing to act in compliance with international law.”40 
                                               
38  Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli, “Surrogate warfare: the art of war in 21st century?,” 
Defense Studies 18, no. 2 (2018): 4. 
39  Charles J. Dunlap Jr, “Lawfare Today…and Tomorrow” in International Law and the 
Changing Character of War, ed. Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger (US 
Naval War College International Law Studies, 2011), 315-325. 
40  Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Andres B. Munoz Mosquera, “Lawfare in Hybrid Wars: 
The 21st Century Warfare,” Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 7 
(2016), 63-87. 
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Democratic societies are governed by and adhere to the rule of law. By 
opting for affirmative lawfare within legal constraints they ensure their choice 
of responding to hybrid warfare will be successful and legitimate.”
41
 In the same 
way, using lawfare is very important in a situation of competition of great 
powers. As a rule, they do not want to have smaller countries near them which 
are tightly integrated with their competitors; therefore, they might act to secure 
their interests. In the case of Ukraine, this was done through invasion and 
annexation. In countries like Bulgaria, which is EU and NATO member, one 
effective way to do so is lawfare.  
 
 
Third-level Concept: Indicators 
 
In order to distinguish if a specific case is a case of lawfare or not, Kittrie 
has proposed two tests:
42
 “The actor uses law to create the same or similar 
effects as those traditionally sought from conventional kinetic military action – 
including impacting the key armed force decision-making and capabilities of the 
target” and “One of the actor’s motivations is to weaken or destroy an adversary 
against which the lawfare is being deployed.”
43
  
As the lawfare can be waged by international organizations, states, 
autonomies, NGOs, groups or even individuals, it can take place in 
international, national and sub-national levels; it can take different forms such 
as: Creating new international laws designed to disadvantage an adversary; 
reinterpreting existing international laws so as to disadvantage an adversary; 
using international law to generate intrusive and protracted investigations by 
international organizations; generating international organizations votes to 
disadvantage an adversary; generating international law advisory opinions in 
international forums; using international law as grounds for “universal 
jurisdiction” prosecutions of third-country officials in national courts for alleged 
war crimes; Using international law as grounds for criminal prosecutions of 
domestic companies in national courts; Creating new national laws designed to 
put foreign vendors of strategic products to a choice between one’s own market 
and that of an adversary; National legislature actions other than passing new 
laws; National permitting processes; Sub-national legislation.
44
 
                                               
41  Ibid. 
42  Orde Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 8. 
43  Idib. 
44  The full typology of Kittrie’s lawfare can be read in his book Lawfare: Law as a Weapon 
of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 13-15. In this paper only the cases 
considered relevant for the study of the topic are quoted. 
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To the above-mentioned forms, I would add two more: (1) bending the 
national law or convincing the national or local legislature to accept new laws 
that put an adversary in a disadvantageous position, and (2) preventing the 
development of a clear definition to a specific situation. The last two forms 
could be seen as a certain innovation, as far as they study cases where hybrid 
war agents partly coincide with political elites and when their activity creates a 
situation of uncertainty, difficult to be assessed and managed. The first point is 
important in the context of hybrid war. While in the cases proposed by Kittrie it 
is assumed that the countries – through their institutions – act in defense of their 
national interests, the nature of the hybrid warfare leads to capturing the state 
from within and institutional decay. Therefore, it can lead to a situation in 
which the institutions and legislatures are engaged in legal activities in defense 
of interests, different from the national ones. The second point is somehow 
connected to the ideas of Kittrie about generating protracted investigations by 
international organizations but goes in more depth. In order to determine the 
scope of the national or international law, one must first analyze and define a 
specific situation. However, when this process is obstructed so are the 
consequent actions. The ambiguous situation creates confusion and uncertainty 
about what to do and who is responsible of what. To illustrate better the 
situation, I would give the example of the war in Ukraine. It is still not 
determined whether this is an armed conflict between two states – Russia and 
Ukraine –, if it is a non-international armed conflict, or a local civil unrest. The 
obstruction, the deniability, the propaganda, and disinformation about the nature 
of the conflict make it very hard to agree on the appropriate course of actions 
and on giving the adequate response. Identically, the second point can refer to 
the cases in which the nature of the conflict is hidden, and measures are taken 
masked under “humanitarian intervention”, “mission to protect human rights” 
etc., to meddle in the affairs of third country with or without UN charter.  
A remark should be made here. The international law does not establish a 
judicial system or a coercive penal one. The UN Security Council could enforce 
international law on states that violate some of its charter, especially related to 
human rights. Nevertheless, in cases in which states strong enough decide not to 
follow any specific aspect of the international law, the law might change 
according to the new reality. Alternatively, states can decide to stay out of 
specific agreements. For example, if a country is not participating in specific 
agreement regarding human rights, it is not granted automatically immunity to 
violate it, and it still can be sanctioned by the UN or individually by strong 
states who find that unacceptable. This is due to the existence of Jus Cogens 
laws – peremptory norms, which are above the state’s will and must be 
respected by all countries, but which are also subject of interpretation by the 
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states. Therefore, international law is “more ethical than legal”
45
 and it works as 
long as the countries want to make it work. Thus, using international law as a 
tool of warfare is limited by the amount of power the state has, the amount of 
influence it can generate in support of a specific cause, and the amount of 
damage it can do to an adversary country. In some cases, that damage can be 
done to the economy or even to the image and credibility of the country, but it 
can also have a backlash effect. In that sense, even the most powerful countries 
cannot feel secure from such treats as they can be targeted by other countries, 
providing they are able to generate enough support. Therefore, a leading 
principle in international law is the principle of good faith, as the International 
Court of Justice has established: “[t]he Court recalls that, according to 
customary international law as expressed in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23  May  1969,  a  treaty  must  be  
interpreted  in  good  faith  in  accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”
46
 
The intentional non-application of this principle allows situations in which 
specific actions that are either difficult to characterize or that non-formally 
breach the agreement are possible, but doing them would render the purpose of 
the agreement vain.  
 
 
Russia’s Experience in Lawfare 
 
Russia has significant experience in using hybrid war; it is impressive 
enough to make some authors to see hybrid war as “quasi-theory of Russian 
foreign policy.”
47
 Lawfare is relevant as one of its forms. Let us remember that 
Ukraine agreed to transfer the nuclear weapons it possessed after the dissolution 
of the USSR and asked territorial guarantees in return. In 1994 the Budapest 
Memorandum was signed between Russia, Ukraine, US and UK. The idea of 
the agreement was that territorial integrity of Ukraine would be respected by 
Russia and Russia will refrain from the “threat or use of force”
48
 against 
Ukraine. During 2015, when Crimea was annexed by Russia, Russian officials 
                                               
45  James Brown Scott, “The legal nature of international law,” Columbia Law Review vol. 5, 
no. 2 (1905): 128-130. 
46  Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 
International Court of Justice, December 12, 1996, https://www.refworld.org/ 
cases,ICJ,414ada66f.html.   
47  Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith, “Russia and hybrid warfare –going beyond the label, part 
II,” in Aleksanteri Papers 1 (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 2016), 11. 
48  United Nations, “Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s 
accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons A/49/765 
S/1994/1399,” December 5, 1994, http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/ 
12/13943175580.pdf.  
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denied any violation of the agreement arguing that they did not use force, but 
instead compelled with the “will of the people of Crimea who wished to join”, 
blaming for the situation in Ukraine the “complicated internal processes, which 
Russia and its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum have nothing to do 
with.”
49
 This strategy of denial and misinformation about the obligations of 
Russia is a clear example of reinterpreting the existing international laws to 
disadvantage the enemy, which falls into the broader legal category of “abuse of 
right” and treaty abuse. Russia deliberately did not apply the principle of good 
faith in the interpretations of its obligations which resulted in Ukraine territorial loss 
and Russian territorial gain, which was precisely the purpose of the agreement. 
Another example of Russia employing strategies of lawfare can be seen in its 
declaration to “defend the rights of all Russians including of those living abroad”
50
 
which was applied to the situation of Georgia and Ukraine. First of all, there are 
indications that Russia was preparing for the events by giving passports easier to 
citizens living in neighboring countries and regions such as Abkhazia, Ossetia and 
Crimea in order to be able to claim presence there and to extend on these territories 
its principle through amendment of its own laws regarding citizenships.
51
 The same 
author Mark Voyager has found out that Russia has amended its laws to allow 
annexation of regions of neighboring states following local referenda. Secondly, 
Russia attempted to use the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to sanction 
the opening of “humanitarian corridors,” “prevention of humanitarian crisis,” and 
“prevention of Russian genocide” to justify its intervention in Ukraine.
52
 Thirdly, it 
used Kosovo and Libya as legal precedents for its actions. It is worth to mention as 
well that several Ukrainian officials were sentenced by Russian courts.
53
 All this 
shows not only the Russian creativity in bending the national and the international 
law, but also a motivation to weaken or destroy its opponents, behind the Russian 
actions. 
A third example of Russia using lawfare is the campaign against the US 
planned intervention in Iraq in 2003. Russia managed to create substantial 
support for its cause allying itself with Germany and France and other European 
countries. While it was not able to stop the invasion, the actions led to а veto in 
                                               
49  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman 
Alexander Lukashevich answers a media question about the situation around the Budapest 
Memorandum,” March 14, 2015, https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/576620025714503681. 
50  David M. Herszenhorn, “Putin Vows to ‘Actively Defend’ Russians Living Abroad,” 
Atlantic Council, July 2, 2014, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/putin-
vows-to-actively-defend-russians-living-abroad/.  
51  Mark Voyger, “Russia’s Use of ‘Legal’ as an Element of its Comprehensive Warfare 
Strategy,” Land Power Magazine (2015): 20. 
52  James P. Rudolph, “How Putin Distorts R2P in Ukraine,” Оpencanada.org, March 7, 
2014, https://www.opencanada.org/features/how-putin-distorts-r2p-in-ukraine/.  
53  Knipp, Kersten, “What is the real goal of Russia in Libya?,” Deutsche Welle, December 
22, 2019, https://p.dw.com/p/3VDrd.  
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UNSC, and to a series of international and national investigations questioning 
the legality of the war.
54
 although detailed research on the topic is required, at 
first glance it would seem that the outcome of these actions was that the United 
States’ image was damaged, they undermined the relations between EU 
countries and the US and made the Euro-Atlantic integration slower. The 
actions had an effect in the American society as well, reducing the support for 
the war. 
The Kerch Strait Incident is another example of lawfare. On 25 
November 2018, the Russian coastal guard fired upon and captured Ukrainian 
Navy vessels which were attempting to pass the Kerch Strait. Russia denied the 
existence of the international armed conflict (IAC) between itself and Ukraine 
and did not accept the claim of having occupied Crimea. If that was the case, 
the Russian actions would constitute a violation of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which obliges it to operate in 
innocent passage in the Ukrainian territorial sea and gives the right of innocent 
passage to Ukrainian naval ships.
55
 If there is IAC however, which is what the 
majority of the international community appears to agree upon, the UNCLOS is 
displaced by the Law of Naval Warfare, which indeed grants Russia the right to 
fire, capture and destroy Ukrainian ships. Nevertheless, the captured Ukrainian 
sailors should have been treated as prisoners of war (POWs), and instead, they 
were treated like common criminals. With its actions, Russia successfully 
exploited the gray zone of legality between the peacetime and wartime 
dimensions of the Crimea’s current situation in order to push its own 
geopolitical agenda, while creating chaos and confusion. 
Lawfare can be characterized as an asymmetric form of warfare – as far 
as in the case of Hezbollah, which puts its weapons and fighters behind a “live 
shield”, in order to create the impression that Israelis are guilty for the plenty of 
civilians. This “weakness” of democracy is always used by its enemies: 
“Knowing that our society so respects the rule of law that it demands 
compliance with it, our enemies carefully attack our military plans as illegal and 
immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary to the law of war. Our 
vulnerability here is what philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz would term 
our ‘center of gravity.”
56
 
 
 
                                               
54  Deutsche Welle, “Operation Desert Storm fifteen years ago,” Deutsche Welle, January 16, 
2006, https://p.dw.com/p/Atmv.  
55  Grigorov, Petar, “The incident in the Kerchen straight: causes and consequences,” 
Geopolitika, November 28, 2018, https://geopolitica.eu/aktualno/2922-intsidentat-v-
kerchenskiya-proliv-prichini-i-posleditsi.  
56  William Eckhardt, “Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws His Sword,” Chicago 
Journal of International Law 431 (2003): 4. 
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From Indicators to Empirical Analysis 
 
 The current paper will use two-step analysis to determine if a given 
situation is a case of lawfare or not.  
First, each case will be examined. If it corresponds to the following 
criteria: is it a case where there is a use, threat to use, or misuse of the law as a 
substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective 
(Q1)? Is it a case where there is a use, threat to use, or misuse of international 
law to threaten state interests (Q2)? Is it a case where the use, threat to use, or 
misuse is used as a rhetorical device intended to discredit parties who attempt to 
engage with international law as a means to ensure accountability and 
compliance (Q3)? Is it a case, in which the law is used as a weapon, the 
legitimacy of which is defined by its user’s intentions (Q4)? Is the actor using 
law to create the same or similar effects as those traditionally sought from 
conventional kinetic military action – including impacting the key armed force 
decision-making and capabilities of the target (Q5)? Is the motivation of the 
actor to weaken or destroy an adversary against which the lawfare is being 
deployed (Q6)? 
Second, once the case is identified, there will be an attempt to put each 
case of lawfare in the Kittrie’s classification. 
 
 
Cases of Lawfare Against Bulgaria 
 
Based on the mentioned criteria in one of the previous sections, I have 
identified four important cases of lawfare against Bulgaria: the case of 
Atomstroyexport against Bulgaria (C1); the threat of a case against Bulgaria 
regarding the cancellation of South Stream (C2); the suspicions that specific 
laws in Bulgaria were changed under pressure from Russia to make South 
Stream possible (C3), and the constant pressure from Russia on Bulgaria 
regarding the Bulgarian military industry and the claims made by Russian side 
about the need for licenses for production (C4). 
 
Case 1: Atomstroyexport against Bulgaria 
 
Perhaps the most notable is the Atomstroyexport case recently lost by 
Bulgaria. The story is strictly related to the nuclear power plant (NPP) Belene, 
whose construction was approved in 1981 by the communist government in 
power back then. The construction was frozen in 1991 during the government of 
Dimitar Popov. Nevertheless, 10 years later, the project was dusted off and in 
2002 the Prime Minister Mr. Saxe-Koburg-Gotha declared that the project will 
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be revitalized. On 29 April 2004, the Council of Ministers takes the decision for 
the construction of Belene with protocol №17/29.04.2004, a decision that has 
been kept secret and was revealed only after a dispute in the court. In 2006 the 
Russian company Atomstroyexport is chosen and they sign an agreement with 
the National Electric Company Bulgaria (NEK) to sign a contract for 
engineering, supply, and construction of the project, which had to be provided 
by the Russian company. In 2008 the Annex 5 was signed between NEK and 
Atomstroyexport for the production and delivery of the equipment, despite the 
lack of a contract. The price of the project was 673,9 million Euro. Later that 
year, the other company chosen to invest in the project, the German RWE, 
refuses to invest before all the details are cleared, and in 2009 decided to 
withdraw. In March 2010 PM Borisov visits the construction site and calls it the 
“supreme form of corruption”,
57
 but later the same year he declared his support 
for the project in front of Russian Media. In 2011 NEK and Atomstroyexport 
sign a memorandum, which was attacked by the Minister of Energy Traycho 
Traykov, who called the director of NEK a “national traitor”. In the absence of 
strategic investor, in 2012 the Borisov government stops the project, an act 
sanctioned with a decision of the Parliament.
58
 In 2013, a national referendum 
for the future of Belene was held, which was not validated due to not enough 
voter participation. Nevertheless, the discussion was sent to the Parliament 
where the Parliament decided to stop the project.
59
 During the same year, a legal 
case between Atomstroyexport and NEK for the construction of Belene was 
forwarded to the International Court of Arbitration (ICA). In 2016 the court 
decided that NEK had to pay for the equipment ordered by Annex 5, a total 
amount of 628,9 million euro.
60
  
As already mentioned, the project has been revived during the 
government of Saxe-Koburg-Gota. During the negotiations for joining the 
European Union, the three Ministers Kuneva, Passi and Kovachev had already 
agreed to close the 3
rd
 and the 4
th
 reactors of the existing nuclear power plant 
Kozloduy in exchange for permission to build a new one – Belene. The main 
arguments for the construction of the new NPP was that the most modern 
reactors, 5
th
 and 6
th
, in Kozloduy will only be operational until 2017 and 2019 
respectively, after which they will close. This of course was not true – the 
blocks at the NPP were modernized, even if it happened in the last moment, and 
the reactors were given permission to operate for another 10 years. These 
permissions however are given by the Nuclear Regulatory Agency and their 
                                               
57  Vladislava Peeva, “NPP “Belene” - Supreme Form of Corruption,” Mediapool.bg, March 
16, 2010, https://www.mediapool.bg/aets-belene-vissha-forma-na-koruptsiya-news163044.html. 
58  Capital, “The chronology of the project”, Capital, September 21, 2016, https://www.capital.bg/politika_ 
i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2016/09/21/2831281_hronologiia_na_proekta_aec_belene/.  
59  Ibid. 
60  Ibid. 
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maximum period is 10 years. The Russian experts who participated in the 
modernization had already expressed the opinion that the reactors can work for 
another 10 years at least, or until 2037/2039 or more. Therefore, at least on 
expert level, we do not see a pressure from Russia to build Belene. As a matter 
of fact, the Russian side has carried out the modernization of the current 
reactors in a way that would allow them to operate for a longer period. More 
about the impact on the energy security of Bulgaria will be discussed in the next 
sections, dedicated to energy. 
The case Atomstroyexport can however be viewed as an example of lawfare 
against Bulgaria. The question is not only about the compensation which must be 
paid for a project that has already swallowed billions and produced nothing. The 
defeat at the ICA impacted the decision making of the country and led to the 
cancellation of previous decisions to stop the project and to the decision to revive 
again the project, against the national interests of the country. 
This is a case of using the law as a substitute of traditional military means 
in order to achieve operational victory. One of the goals of hybrid warfare is to 
achieve a situation of state capture. In this case, we can talk about economic 
capture. Bulgarian energetic dependency on Russia was reinforced. The use of 
law led to reopening the project which, if built, will be by Russian investor, as 
stated by both Bulgarian and Russian officials. It clearly threatens Bulgarian 
interests in favor of foreign interests.  
 
 
Case 2: The threat of a case against Bulgaria regarding the 
cancellation of South Stream 
 
An almost identical situation was witnessed regarding the cancellation of 
South Stream. The project started in November 2006 when Gazprom and the 
Italian Eni signed a contract for direct gas deliveries in Italy starting 2008, 
which by 2010 should have been increased to 3 billion cubic meters. In 2007 the 
Gazprom representative Alexander Medvedev and the representative of Eni 
Paolo Scaroni signed a memorandum on the construction of South Stream. On 
24 June 2007 in Zagreb, Croatia, during a meeting of the heads of states from 
the South Europe on the questions of energy, the Bulgarian President Georgi 
Parvanov expressed interest to his Russian counterpart President Putin, to join 
the project. On 12 July 2007 in accordance with this position, an expert group 
was created to prepare an official agreement with the Russian side. On 8 
November 2007 in Moscow, a Declaration for the Transit Gas Pipeline South 
Stream was signed between the Russian and Bulgarian ministers of energy. On 
18 January 2008 Bulgaria and Russia signed an agreement for the construction 
of South Stream, which was ratified by the Bulgarian Parliament on 25 June 
2008. The project was joined by Serbia, Hungary, Greece, Turkey, and 
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Slovenia, which guaranteed the transit to Italy. On 13 November 2010 during a 
visit of President Putin in Bulgaria, a joint company was created by Gazprom 
and Bulgarian Energy Holding with capital of 15,6 million Leva. It was agreed 
that the South Stream infrastructure would start at the Russian port Anapa, pass 
through the Black Sea, cross northern Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and 
arrive in Turkey. In Bulgaria, the length of the pipeline was supposed to be 538 
kilometres. The capacity of the gas pipeline was of 63 billion cubic meters per 
year and the price for building it on Bulgarian soil was estimated to be around 
3,5 billion Euro. On 15 November 2012, the representative of Gazprom Alexey 
Miler and the representative of the Bulgarian Energy Holding Mihail Andonov 
signed a contract for the investment decision for South Stream. On 31 October 
2013, the beginning of the construction was inaugurated but very soon it was 
put on hold, in 2014, after the procedures against Bulgaria by the EU 
Commission.
61
 On 1 December 2014 President Putin announced in Turkey that 
the project will be canceled and another one, called Turkish Stream, will be 
built.
62
 Putin and Gazprom announced that the cancellation was a result of the 
Bulgarian rejection to carry on the project and of the EU reluctance to be a 
partner to Russia, threatening to redirect the gas flows to Asia instead. The so-
called reluctance of the EU in fact was caused by objective legal problems – it 
was not compatible with the Third Package – the latest round of EU energy 
market regulations. In particular, Gazprom had to allow the access to other 
suppliers and not reserve all the pipeline capacity for itself. Risking 
encountering the same problems, Italy also refused to invest more in the project. 
Brussels suspected that through the choice of Bulgarian-Russian consortium of 
companies, which was related to the Russian government and to the Bulgarian 
government, in particular to the deputy Delyan Peevski, Bulgaria has violated 
the EU regulations and laws.
63
 President Putin announced that Bulgaria would 
lose 400 million Euro per year.
64
 
The Bulgarian version of the cancellation differs. Nine months after the 
project was announced as cancelled by Putin in Turkey, the Bulgarian 
government was still keeping working formally on the project in absence of an 
official letter of cancellation. The explanation given by the government was that 
there is a fear of legal actions against Bulgaria.
65
 The final confirmation about 
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the legal threats for compensations for the presumed cancellation by the 
Bulgarian side, made by Gazprom, can be seen in the agreements it made with 
the Commission, which forbid Gazprom from asking any form of compensation 
from Bulgaria regardless whether the legal grounds for this are justified or not. 
This was part of a broader agreement between Gazprom and the Commission, 
announced in May 2018.
66
 
The threat for legal actions, while not officially announced by the 
Russian side, apparently pushed Bulgaria into spending additional resources and 
money into a project which was obvious it could not happen, although the 
extent of the damage caused by this legal threat is hard to estimate. Thanks to an 
intervention of the Commission and the conclusion of the agreement with 
Gazprom, the situation with Atomstroyexport and Belene did not repeat. The 
threat to use lawfare is also a form of lawfare.  
 
 
Case 3: The suspicions that specific laws in Bulgaria were changed 
under pressure from Russia to make South Stream possible 
 
A problem related again to South Stream is the possible Russian 
involvement into the changing of existing legal framework in order to attempt 
exclusion of this gas pipeline from the Third Package. The Russian involvement 
was discovered by the Bulgarian political party Reformatorski Blok after court 
intervention in accordance with the Law on Access to Public Information. It 
was discovered that the law change proposal put forward by the deputies Tasko 
Eremenkov and Yavor Kuyumdzhiev is a result of two letters (99-00-
480/28.08.2013 and Е-93-00-1304/28.08.2013) from the end of 2013, sent to 
the Ministry of Energy and Economy in which the company “South Stream 
Transport” (majority owned by Gazprom)
67
 proposed modifications in the 
Bulgarian Law on Energy, in particular to include the new category of “sea gas 
pipeline”. According to the law modifications, for “sea gas pipelines” specific 
paragraphs of the Law would not be applied. This attempt was made to exclude 
South Stream from the existing European regulations, which gives a legal basis 
to the agreement signed between Bulgaria and Russia on 31 October 2013 to 
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build the project “in accordance to the Bulgarian law”.
68
 In addition, it was 
discovered that the Ministry of Interior the State Agency for National Security 
also requested information about these letters, which, as the party members 
pointed out, can be a case of a breach of the national security.
69
 The words of 
Reformatorski Blok were also confirmed later by a publication on the webpage 
of the Ministry of Energy and Economy. The Ministry published two letters sent 
by the ex-Minister Dragomir Stoynev to his Russian counterpart Alexander 
Novak, in which he declared that “the received proposals for law modifications 
were examined and discussed in detail.”
70
 
While there is no official confirmation, the interest shown in this event by 
the security agencies in Bulgaria could be an indication of a possible national 
security problem. The proposed law modifications were an attempt to exclude 
the South Stream project from the Third Package, which undermined the EU 
trust in Bulgaria and indications showed that they would not be accepted by the 
Commission. The Russian proposals for law changes cannot be seen as genuine 
concerns to improve the legal framework as they have clearly as intention the 
realization of the South Stream, in violation of the Third Package.  
 
 
Case 4: The constant pressure from Russia on Bulgaria 
regarding the Bulgarian military industry and the claims made 
by the Russian side about the need for licenses for production 
 
The question about the Russian licenses is an ongoing, although 
peripheral problem, persisting in the Russian-Bulgarian relations after the 
dissolution of the USSR. During the communist period, Bulgaria positioned 
itself as a major arms and military equipment producer, developing a strong 
military industry. Between 1945 and 1989 the Russian Rosvooruzhenie has 
given to Bulgaria around 670 licenses for production.
71
 For each license there 
was an agreement on the number and the period of production. According to 
these agreements, the Russian side has the obligation to provide the innovations 
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on the selected equipment to Bulgaria and buy part of the production, and 
Bulgaria has the obligation to produce the exact amount specified, not to sell to 
third countries outside of the Warsaw Pact without a permission from Moscow, 
and of course – to pay for the license.
72
 After the dissolution of the USSR 
Russia has stopped providing innovations and buying Bulgarian production, and 
Bulgaria has stopped paying. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria 
has found new markets for its own military production, including in the USA. It 
is important to clarify that the huge majority of these 670 licenses, around 70-
80%, are for weapons or military equipment which is obsolete and therefore – 
not in production anymore.
73
 Bulgarian military production facilities include 
Arsenal AD, TEREM, VMZ Sopot, Samel 90 and others. The country produces 
and exports equipment ranging from small arms and bulletproof vests to mortars 
and armored vehicles to over 30 countries.  
The question is rarely put forward during high level meetings but is often 
discussed at work-level meetings. An example of the Russian position can be 
seen in an announcement made on 28 December 2016 by the Director of the 
Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation Maria Zakharova. She commented that the military industry 
in Bulgaria worked with Soviet licenses which were expired, and the Bulgarian 
government did not seem interested in renewing them.
74
 In 2017 Zakharova 
repeated the position that Russia wants to settle the issue with Bulgaria and 
expressed expectations Bulgaria would participate in the dialogue. She pointed 
out that this is an important topic in the Russian-Bulgarian relations.
75
 
At the beginning, the Bulgarian position was that the production of the 
weapons and military equipment only use some ideas from the old Russian 
originals and now they are not the same anymore.
76
 In addition, Bulgaria 
claimed that Russia has violated some of the license agreements by not 
providing innovations and not buying part of the Bulgarian production anymore. 
Lately it appears that Bulgaria maintains this position that Russia has no legal 
grounds for claims for that Soviet production.
77
 Bulgaria points out too that no 
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73  Ibid. 
74  Boryana Raycheva, “Russia accused Bulgaria for selling weapons in Syria,” Eurocom.bg, 
December 28, 2016, https://eurocom.bg/new/rusiia-obvini-bulgariia-che-prodava-orujie-v-
siriia.  
75  “Russia wants to settle the licenses for arms production,” Faktor.bg, July 17, 2017, 
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76  Tanya Ivanova, “The Russian weapon licenses will be phased out from our production,” 
Money.bg, October 10, 2006, https://money.bg/archive/ruskite-orazheyni-litsenzi-otpadat-
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77  Krasimir Karakachanov, “Karakachanov: Bulgaria will not negotiate with Russia for 
weapons licenses,” Investor.bg, February 24, 2019, https://www.investor.bg/ikonomika-i-
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other country from the Warsaw Pact, including even Serbia, has agreed to pay 
for new licenses.
78
  
The consistent habit shown by the Russian side to put forward this 
problem during meetings of different type demonstrates the consistency of these 
intentions. This constant political pressure on the legal problem with Bulgaria is 
extremely dangerous, as it can put an entire industry under Russian control. 
Moreover, obviously this industry is of special importance for the national 
security. This would also provide a leverage to the Russian side to regulate the 
relationship between Bulgaria, through its military production complex, and the 
other NATO member states, since Russia would have to formally approve any 
weapon export deal. Ultimately it could have an extremely negative effect on 
the industry and lead to loss of workplaces for thousands of employers working 
in these factories.  
 
 
Observations 
 
 I will try to relate now the four cases with the empirical indicators and 
forms of hybrid wars (Table 1). This inductive approach will help to define the 
nature of cases chosen as ones of lawfare. if we combine it with deductive one, 
we will be able to go the way back – from empirics to theory, enriching it in this 
way the very concept of lawfare.  
In the first case we can clearly see how the threat to use, and then the use 
itself of international law to settle the trade dispute between Russia and 
Bulgaria, has led to ignoring results of a referendum, even if its results were not 
binding. It has led also to Parliament decision to block the construction of a new 
NPP. Bulgaria and Russia did not find a way to settle the dispute and following 
the unsuccessful Bulgarian defense at ICA, Bulgaria was sentenced to pay for 
the produced equipment and subsequently restarted the project.  
In the second case, there was a threat to use law in a way identical to the 
first case. However due to negotiations at a higher level, this was avoided. 
Nevertheless, it was an unsuccessful attempt which ended with the construction 
of Turkish Stream instead. Although there were no concrete actions against 
Bulgaria, there was a threat to use them. All this was accompanied by anti-
Bulgarian rhetoric from Russia who actively blamed Bulgaria for the failure of 
the South Stream project. 
In the third case we can see example of bending and changing the 
national law in order to accommodate for action which is against the national 
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277687/.   
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interest. In addition, this change was used to reinterpret the existing law and 
introduce a new term, which created confusion about the nature of South 
Stream.  
In the fourth case it is shown how the threat to use international law has 
given grounds to push this problem on the agenda of bilateral talks, even if 
apparently there are no legal grounds for such activities.  
All the four cases are related to key sectors of the Bulgarian economy. 
Bulgaria is almost entirely dependent on Russian gas import and the huge 
investments in this big gas infrastructure project is likely to solidify the status-
quo, draining attention and resources from possible alternative gas projects 
which would diversify the Bulgarian market. In the same way, a construction of 
a new NPP would guarantee long-lasting Russian presence in the Bulgarian 
energy production, through import of nuclear fuel and general maintenance. The 
case with the Bulgarian weapon industry is particularly sensitive as it is related 
not only to economy, but also to national security.  
With the results of this empirical analysis, is it possible to go way back, 
i.e., to return from the third level concept to the first level one and to add some 
new aspect to the theory? It seems that at least three modest contributions 
should be emphasized. The first is that, from an empirical point of view, the 
analysis facilitates the answer to the question about what act could be labelled 
lawfare (through pointing out shared features of the cases). Second, it proves 
that lawfare has effects not only on the legality of a given act, but also on its 
legitimacy. Although lawfare is not as spectacular as some other forms of 
hybrid war, it constitutes a serious threat to national and international security 
as far as it gives legitimacy to narratives and images of the aggressor; 
legitimacy that otherwise they would not obtain.  Third, even when a court 
decision is formally just, in a specific political context it can be used as a tool of 
hybrid war.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper had as one of its purposes to confirm the value of empirical 
approach to lawfare as a form of hybrid war. Indeed, much more solid empirical 
foundation is needed in order to settle a concept able to bring under its common 
denominator the immense multitude of cases that always remain under the 
threshold, in the gray zone in-between peace and war, as well as in-between 
legality, legitimacy and abuse of law. The deeply contextualized analysis of the 
cases showed outcomes that challenge the conventional wisdom: for example, 
the outcomes of the right application of the law can also be used as lawfare 
under specific conditions. To what is already known in the academic debate, 
this paper added two new forms of lawfare: “bending the national law or 
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convincing the national or local legislature to accept new laws that put an 
adversary in disadvantageous position” and “preventing a development of clear 
definition to a specific situation”. I argued that lawfare is always a source of 
hybridity when it is combined with other, not necessarily kinetic means, and 
that it contributes to the achievement of the goals of hybrid war, which are not 
different from the goals of any other one - to compel one’s enemy to do one’s 
will. My definition of hybrid war, emphasizing the destruction of the 
institutions (through eroding trust and governability), communities (through 
impeding informed individual and collective choices) and society has a logical 
conclusion that one of the easiest ways to do so is to delegitimize them and to 
give legitimacy to narratives and images that cannot obtain such legitimacy 
without the use of law as an arm in order to capture a relevant state.  Then, if 
lawfare is understood to mean “the use of law, or exploitation of aspects of a 
legal system, to achieve tactical or strategic advantages in the context of 
conflict”
79
 or “a weapon of war,”
80
 are democratic countries allowed to use it as 
a defensive mean? This is one of the directions that current research can take in 
the future.   
The research has certain limitations. First, this article examines four cases 
in a presumed Russian hybrid warfare against Bulgaria, which is not enough to 
get a more sophisticated idea about lawfare as a tool of hybrid war. Besides, it 
would be useful to conduct a similar research in other countries in Eastern and 
Central Europe, in order to determine whether the Russian lawfare against them 
is part of a broader hybrid strategy or not. Finally, it can be useful to study cases 
of non-Russian lawfare against European countries and attempt to determine the 
dynamics around them. It will contribute to meeting in a more successful way 
the challenges of lawfare as one of the tools of hybrid war. While more research 
about countering lawfare is needed, the success of the Russian lawfare against 
Bulgaria, excepting the case of South Stream, where Bulgaria was backed by 
the EU, indicates that one of the possible countermeasures for Bulgaria is the 
closer integration, cooperation and coordination with the EU and NATO states 
and complying with the common European policies when it is possible.  
 
 
Table 1: Relating Cases, Indicators and Forms 
N Questions C1 C2 C3 C4 
Q1 
Is it a case where there is a use, 
threat to use, or misuse of the law 
as substitute for traditional 
military means to achieve an 
operational objective 
Yes Yes No Yes 
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Q2 
Is it a case where there is a use, 
threat to use, or misuse of 
international law to threaten state 
interests 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Q3 
Is it a case where the use, threat to 
use, or misuse of law is used as a 
rhetorical device intended to 
discredit parties who attempt to 
engage with international law as a 
means to ensure accountability 
and compliance 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Q4 
Is it a case, in which the law is 
used as a weapon, the legitimacy 
of which is defined by its user’s 
intentions 
No No No No 
Q5 
Is the actor using law to create the 
same or similar effects as those 
traditionally sought from 
conventional kinetic military 
action – including impacting the 
key armed force decision-making 
and capabilities of the target 
No No No No 
Q6 
Is the motivation of the actor to 
weaken or destroy an adversary 
against which the lawfare is being 
deployed 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F1 
Creating new international laws 
designed to disadvantage an 
adversary 
No No No No 
F2 
Reinterpreting existing 
international laws so as to 
disadvantage an adversary 
No No No No 
F3 
Using international law to 
generate intrusive and protracted 
investigations by international 
organizations 
Yes Yes No No 
F4 
Generating international 
organizations votes to 
disadvantage an adversary 
No No No No 
F5 
Generating international law 
advisory opinions in international 
forums 
No No No No 
 
Using international law as 
grounds for “universal 
jurisdiction” prosecutions of 
third-country officials in national 
courts for alleged war crimes 
No No No No 
F6 
Using international law as 
grounds for criminal prosecutions 
of domestic companies in national 
courts 
No No No No 
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F7 
Creating new national laws 
designed to put foreign vendors of 
strategic products to a choice 
between one’s own market and 
that of an adversary 
No No No Yes 
F8 
National legislature actions other 
than passing new laws 
No No No No 
F9 National permitting processes No No No No 
F10 Sub-national legislation No No No No 
F11 
Bending the national law or 
convincing the national or local 
legislature to accept new laws 
that put an adversary in 
disadvantageous position 
No No Yes No 
F12 
Preventing a development of clear 
definition to a specific situation. 
No Yes No No 
Source: This table is elaborated by the author. 
 
 
 
 
